Far-right extremists’ use of humour

Authored by Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed,
RAN External Experts
It’s not funny anymore.
Far-right extremists’ use of humourEUROPEAN COMMISSION
Radicalisation Awareness Network2021
It’s not funny anymore.
Far-right extremists’ use of humourLEGAL NOTICE
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rightholders.IT’S NOT FUNNY ANYMORE. FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISTS’ USE OF HUMOUR
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Humour has become a central weapon of extremist movements to subvert open societies and to lower the
threshold towards violence. Especially within the context of a recent wave of far-right terrorist attacks, we
witness “playful” ways in communicating racist ideologies. As far-right extremists strategically merge with
online cultures, their approach changes fundamentally. This trend has been especially facilitated by the
so-called alt-right and has spread globally. This predominantly online movement set new standards to
rebrand extremist positions in an ironic guise, blurring the lines between mischief and potentially
radicalising messaging. The result is a nihilistic form of humour that is directed against ethnic and sexual
minorities and deemed to inspire violent fantasies — and eventually action. This paper scrutinises how
humour functions as a potential factor in terms of influencing far-right extremist violence. In doing so, we
trace the strategic dissemination of far-right narratives and discuss how extremists conceal their
misanthropic messages in order to deny ill intention or purposeful harm. These recent developments pose
major challenges for practitioners: As a new generation of violent extremists emerges from digital
subcultures without a clear organisational centre, prevention strategies need to renew focus and cope with
the intangible nature of online cultures.
Introduction
Humour in the context of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has largely been
discussed as a means to combat extremist ideologies (1). Various counter-narrative campaigns have
deployed humour to question the authority of extremist groups and ridicule their ambitions. Even though
it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of such campaigns, research has shown that such endeavours
are appropriate to spin democratic alternatives for affected youths (2). Thus, the potential of humour as
a means of persuasion and disengagement is acknowledged by a variety of actors. Yet, much less
attention has been paid to how humour is utilised by extremist groups and subcultures as a means of
recruitment. Addressing this gap in P/CVE research and practice has become an urgent issue, especially
in light of the digitally mediated wave of far-right terrorism that has struck Christchurch, El Paso and
Halle — amongst others.
The perpetrators of these attacks did not have a criminal record and were neither members of extremist
organisations nor did they have any links to local scenes. Rather, they emerged from digital subcultures,
which share — besides their receptiveness to extremist ideas — a cynical style of humour intended to
numb and desensitise its consumers to the use of violence. In their manifestos, the terrorists
consequently adopt expressions from meme cultures and online milieus. In particular, image -based
forums such as 4chan and 8kun (previously 8chan) developed as places from where extremist messages
with humorous and ironic underpinnings spread into the mainstream, thereby making it increasingly
difficult to distinguish between organised action and individual acts of provocation. Users of th ese forums
rebrand far-right extremist ideologies and make them attractive for new target groups that are not on the
radar of practitioners and law enforcement.
Thinking of far-right extremism, we might associate this with backward-looking, stiff and formal zealots
who act on the fringes of the political spectrum. Yet, the skinhead image has long been overcome and,
in fact, also more recent phenomena like the Identitarians have lost traction throughout Europe. As far -
right extremists strategically merge with online cultures, their approach changes drastically. In fact, they
have learned the lesson that if — in our digitalised societies — a movement wants to be successful, it
needs to be entertaining and participatory. In fact, a shared sense of humour has be come an effective
tool in terms of immersing individuals into extremist ideologies and, as a consequence, contributed to
some of the worst acts of violence in the 21st century.
Analysing the strategic use of humour might thus provide some clues regarding what makes far-right
extremist ideas attractive to a generation of digital natives and how digital cultures have become a
potential factor in terms of evoking and influencing racist mass violence. So how can we make sense of
the connection between humour-driven subcultures and extremist violence? In this research paper we
aim to shed some light on the underlying processes that might help us understand recent developments
in far-right extremism — and to reflect on how countermeasures need to adapt to combat extremism in
(1) ISD and RAN CoE (2015): Counter narratives and alternative narratives, p. 6.
(2) Tuck and Silverman (2016): The counter-narrative handbook.IT’S NOT FUNNY ANYMORE. FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISTS’ USE OF HUMOUR
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the digital age. We begin with a brief primer on the relationship between humour and (far -right)
extremism, followed by a description of the recent conflation of online cultures and far -right extremism.
We then outline the far-right online ecosystem, highlighting the spread and varieties of humour across
different platforms, as well as the potential for violent radicalisation. We conclude by focusing on the
problems in tackling online hate cultures and providing some recommendations to help sup port
practitioners working in this area.
Humour and (far-right) extremism. A primer
While it is a truism that extremist movements are only successful if they speak the language of the masses,
researchers and practitioners have been repeatedly overwhelmed by the new guises that extremist
communication has adopted in the digital era. The playful and ironic re-articulation of white supremacism
and ethnonationalism has largely been understood as an innovative strategy to appeal to broader audiences.
This is certainly true as we see that the rigid structures and fanatic appearance that once marked far-right
extremist groups have gradually faded away. In contrast, such structures have been substituted by a strange
mixture of infantile mischief, communicative ambivalence and a strong dose of nihilism that promote
extremist ideas. Yet, looking back into the history of the far-right — and other forms of — extremism we can
conceive varieties of humour as a steady companion of hate-based mobilisation (3).
Terminology
The terminology used in this paper follows the definitions provided in the 2019 RAN factbook on Far-Right
Extremism: A Practical Introduction:
• “Far-right extremism” is understood as an umbrella concept, which comprises both the radical and
the extreme right.
• Far-right extremism encompasses a range of different ideologies, which may include elements of
cultural, ethnic, and/or racial nationalism.
• Individuals, movements and groups within the far-right extremist spectrum also differ in terms of
how far they are willing to take their activism — i.e. whether they are prepared to use violence or
not.
• There are also inconsistencies regarding the concept of the authoritarian state. Some individuals,
movements and groups may be in favour of overturning democracy completely, whilst others may
support retaining democracy and championing a more heavy-handed state with harsher
punishments for crimes (4).
“The most potent weapons known to mankind are satire and ridicule”
civil rights activist Saul Alinsky wrote back in 1971 in his renowned book Rules for Radicals. This advice
has been key to winning the hearts and minds of people, especially by progressive movements, as “through
humour much is accepted that would have been rejected if presented seriously” (5). In recent years,
Alinsky’s book experienced an unexpected renaissance in far-right circles. Their activists learned the
lesson that laughter is imminently important to strengthen a collective identity and to better communicate
their own positions to outsiders. By reformulating prejudices and disguising them in witty language, the
interplay of hatred and amusement regarding the misery of supposedly inferior groups runs like a golden
(3) Billig (2001): Humour and Hatred, pp. 271–274.
(4) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (2019): Far-right extremism, pp. 6–9.
(5) Alinsky (1971): Rules for radicals, p. 75; p. xviii.